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Hodges v. Evisea Maritime Co.:
DUTY TO CORRECT OR WARN
OF CONDITIONS IN
LONGSHOREMAN'S ACT
In Hodges v. Evisea Maritime Co., 801
F.2d 6781986), the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has held that under
the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act"), 33 U.S.C.
§ 905(b) (1982), before a shipowner can be
said to have a duty to correct or warn of a
condition arising during cargo operations,
the shipowner must be chargeable both
with knowledge of the condition and with
knowledge that despite the danger, the
stevedore is continuing its operations.
On July 26, 1977, the MIV Concordia
Sky, owneq by Evisea, was engaged in
cargo operations in Virginia when an unidentified and semiconscious man was discovered in the No.3 tween deck. The man,
unable to communicate and initially mistaken for a stowaway, was eventually taken
to a hospital. Several days later he was
identified as Gary Hodges, a longshoreman who had worked on the Concordia
Sky during its loading in Baltimore on
July 25th.
An investigation was subsequently conducted by Liberty Mutual, the compensation carrier for the stevedore employing
Hodges, Robert C. Herd & Co. No eyewitnesses to Hodges' injury were found.
Hodges had suffered serious head injuries,
leading him to claim a retrograde memory
loss and an inability to recall anything immediately prior to or following his apparent
accident. Because Liberty Mutual could
not satisfy its statutory burden to show
that Hodges' injury was not work related,
Hodges was awarded disability benefits
paid by Liberty Mutual pursuant to the
Act.
Hodges subsequently sued Evisea and
the charterer of the Concordia Sky, Concordia Line, alleging that the ship's negligence caused his injuries. Liberty Mutual
intervened as a plaintiff to protect its interest. A directed verdict was subsequently
entered in favor of Concordia Line.
Hodges' theory of negligence turned primarily on his assertion that prior to his injuries he was working in the ship's No.2
hold, that he returned to the previously
loaded No. 3 hold to obtain additional
dunnage, and fell through an open hatch
on the No.3 upper tween deck. Hodges
claimed that the vessel's owners were negligent both in leaving the hatch open and
in failing to provide adequate lighting or
other safety measures that would have prevented the fall.
The 1972 amendments to the Act eliminated the right oflongshoremen to recover

from a shipowner for acts caused byunseaworthiness, and further limited the right
to recover to those injuries caused by the
shipowner's negligence. ld. at 683. Under
the amendments, the determination of the
applicable standard of negligence was left
to the courts.
In Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v.
De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981), the
Supreme Court clarified the relative duties of shipowners and stevedores, under
the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The Scindia Court concluded:
Section 905(b) of the LHWCA does
not impose upon the shipowner a continuing duty to inspect the cargo operations once the stevedore has begun
work. Rather, prior to the commencement of stevedoring operations, the
shipowner must "at least" exercise
ordinary care under the circumstances
to have the ship in such a condition
that an experienced stevedore, with
the exercise of reasonable care, can
carry out its operations. The shipowner must warn the stevedore ofhazards that are or should be known to the
vessel, if the hazards are not known or
should be known to the stevedore. The
vessel is also liable, after the stevedoring work has begun, if it actively involves itself in the cargo operations
and its negligence causes an injury, or
if it fails to exercise due care to intervene to protect longshoremen from
hazards under the active control of the
vessel during the stevedoring operation.
ld. at 166-168.
The Hodges court determined that there
was evidence from which the jury could
conclude that under Scindia, the owner's
or crew of the vessel had a duty to intervene and exercise their control over the
No.3 hold to eliminate the dangerous conditions of the open hatch and poor lighting.
The court also concluded that there was
sufficient evidence of a breach of this duty
by the vessel.
Having held that the jury instructions
relating to the allocation of duties of care
with respect to dangerous conditions between the vessel and stevedore during ongoing stevedoring operations were inadequate under Scindia, the Hodges court
found it necessary to reverse and remand
the case for a new trial. The sole jury instruction given by the trial court addressing the relative duties of stevedores and
shipowners once stevedoring operations are
under way was the following: "It is not
contended by the plaintiffs that the shipowner had a duty to superintend or oversee

the operations of the stevedoring company
or its employees, and the shipowner in fact
had no such duty under the facts of this
case." Hodges 801 F.2d at 686. The court
stated that the evidence required a more
detailed instruction delineating the limits,
of the shipowner's duty to intervene during cargo operations with respect to the
dangers posed by the open hatch and unlit
hold.
Prior to the Hodges decision, the Fourth
Circuit had yet to give effect to the 1972
amendments to the Act. The Hodges court
adopted the holding of the Supreme Court
in Scindia with respect to the standard of
negligence applicable to shipowners under
the Act.
This decision places a heavy burden on
stevedores to avoid injuries caused by obvious hazards. The high standard of care
now placed on stevedores is apparent from
the fact that the duty of shipowners exists
only as a supplement to the duty of stevedores in supervising its longshoremen so
that injuries will not result from obvious
or warned of defects of the vessel. Thus,
under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act., 33 U.S.C. § 905
(1982), the duties of the shipowner are
now limited, and the primary burden to
avoid injuries is now placed upon the
stevedore.

- Jennifer Crump

The May Dep't Stores Company
v. Harryman: "BUSINESS
PREMISES" UNDER WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION EXTENDED
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in
May Dep't Stores Co. v. Harryman, 307
Md. 692, 517 A.2d 71 (1986), has concluded that an employee who was injured
on an assigned parking lot, while she was
proceeding directly to her workplace, is
entitled to an award under the Workers'
Compensation Act, Md. Ann. Code art.
101, §§ 15 and 67(6), (the Act). The decision extends, under certain circumstances,
to situations where the lot is not directly
owned by the employer.
The employee, Muriel Harryman, was
employed by The May Department Stores
Company, T/A The Hecht Company
(Hecht's). The store in question was one of
many tenants at a county mall, which is
surrounded by a parking lot. On November 28, 1983, Ms. Harryman parked her
car in the designated parking area, pursuant to a lease agreement between the employer and the owner of the lot. As she approached the mall entrance (about two car
lengths from her vehicle), a person came
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behind her, grabbed her purse, and in so
doing, caught it on her coat. Then, in an
attempt to disentangle the bag and escape,
the assailant threw Ms. Harryman to the
pavement.
Claiming an injury as a result of this incident, Ms. Harryman brought her case
before the Workers' Compensation Commission. She prevailed, and her employer
subsequently appealed to the Circuit Court
for Baltimore County. After summary
judgment was granted Ms. Harryman, the
employer turned to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland for relief. It, in turn,
affirmed the circuit court's decision. On
certiorari, the court of appeals considered
the important public issue presented by
this case.
Hecht's alleged that because the parking
lots surrounding the mall were not owned
by the store, the lots should not be'viewed
as part of the premises, within the meaning of the Act. The employer urged that
the court invaded legislative territory by
extending the statute to include such areas
and that this intrusion entitled it to a de
novo circuit court trial.
The court of appeals initially turned to
the requirements of the Act that must be
satisfied to award an injured employee.
The court noted that the statute specifies an injury must arise out of and in the
course of the employment and emphasized
that the statutory definition of "injury"
includes any purposeful or negligent act
by a third party against the employee,
while that employee is in the course of his
or her employment. The court found support for this interpretation in Giant Food,
Inc. v. Gooch, 245 Md. 160,225 A.2d 431
(1967). There, a compensable injury was
found when an employee was shot while
on his employer's parking lot. The court
was persuaded by the reasoning in Giant
Food, and agreed that third party actions
against an employee, while on the premises,
that result in harm to the employee, are
within the intentions of the Act.
Having overcome this threshold point,
the court proceeded to the question of
whether the injury was sustained in the
course of employment. The query in this
case was confounded by the fact that the
employee had not begun performance of
her work duties. But, the ruling in Department of Correction v. Harris, 232 Md. 180,
192 A.2d 479 (1963), was that a compensable injury occurs when the employee is
"fulfilling those duties or engaged in something incident thereto." Id. at 184, 192
A.2d at 481. The court accepted this to
embrace the period of time when an employee has arrived at the place of employment and is preparing to enter the workplace.
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The court next addressed the problematic
issue of the non-employer owned parking
lot. The court referred to its ruling in Proctor-Silex v. DeBrick, 253 Md. 477, 252
A.2d 800 (1969), where it noted therein
the absurdity of allowing recovery when
the injury is directly on employer-owned
property, but refusing recovery when the
injury occurs on the employee's uninterrupted path to the workplace, but not on
the employer's property. The court there
concluded that "the injuries sustained by
the plaintiff to have arisen out of and in the
course of her employment." Id. at 489, 252
A.2d at 803. The injuries in Proctor-Silex
occurred on the pedestrian sidewalk abutting the employer's office, as Mrs. DeB rick
was arriving for work. The court of appeals
chose, however, not to immediately analogize this decision to the unique situation
of mall parking lots, and turned instead to
1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 15.42 (a) (1985), which states
that most jurisdictions consider parking
lots part of the premises, and is not limited to
parking lots owned, controlled or maintained by the employer. The doctrine
has been applied when the lot, although not owned by the employer,
was exclusively used, or used with the
owner's special permission, or just
used, by the employees of this employer. Thus, ... if a shopping center
parking lot is used by employees of
businesses located in the center, the
rule is applicable.
Id. at 4-87 to 4-10 1.
Several cases in other jurisdictions have
followed the reasoning set forth in Larson.
Particularly germane is the Ohio case of
Frishkorn v. Flowers, 26 Ohio App.2d 165,
270 N .E.2d 366 (1971). In overturning the
traditional holding that the premises must
be owned or controlled by the employer,
the court said that this concept was too
narrow in the special circumstances of
the shopping center workplace. It further
noted that
[T]he employer and the other tenants
of the [shopping center], having reciprocal rental rights and privileges,
were also accorded the common use
and access of the parking area ... for
the purpose of adequately serving and
furthering their business interests. It
follows that the appellant-employee,
as well as the employees of the other
tenants, derived their similar rights
and privileges from the shopping center by virtue of a vested privity in the
objectives of their employers.
Id. at 168-169, 270 N.E.2d at 369.

In consideration of the uniqueness of
this employment situation, the Frishkorn
court developed a test to assist in establishing the boundaries of the premises. It decided that the statutory definition was
meant to be dynamic and thus adaptable to
different circumstances. The meaning of
the premises must be determined "from
the logical and close association of the surrounding area to the premises of employment, together with the peculiar circumstances ..." /d. at 169,270 N.E.2d at 369.
It further elucidated that if a worker sustains an injury resulting from those circumstances and "while discharging a duty
to the employer as a necessary incident to
his work, he is entitled to compensation,
notwithstanding the fact that the surrounding areas are neither owned nor controlled
by the employer." Id.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland noted
that other jurisdictions have held that injuries received on parking lots such as the
one in issue in this case are not compensable. However, the court concluded that
this interpretation is too narrow, and
adopted instead the broader construction.
It viewed this as consistent with its holding in Proctor-Silex, and as not overstepping its jurisdiction into the legislative
arena.
In attempting to define the limits of
business premises, the holding in May
Dep't Stores perhaps raises more questions than it resolves. If an employee, for
instance, arriving at work and parking in a
non-employer owned but designated forthe-employee lot, trips in a pothole and
sustains an injury, is the employer then
liable? If so, must he then assume the
maintenance and upkeep of the lot to shield
himselffrom such liability? Does this then
absolve the owner from such responsibility
as to the employer's employees? Or, may
the employer proceed against the owner on
a negligence theory? These and other issues remain to be addressed in a more precise manner.

- Margaret E. Swain

